FROM ‘I' TO ‘WE': WOJTYŁA'S
PHENOMENOLOGY OF LOVE
PETER L P SIMPSON
Wojtyła's phenomenological personalism turns on the concept human beings identify themselves through a possession and governing of themselves. In the case of love this self-determination presupposes certain emotions in the individual psyche, require feelings, especially those of libido, need to be integrated into acts of self-determination. A vital element in this analysis is a Personalistic Tradition, that people should certainly treat one another as self-determining agents having distinct personal ends who are able thereby to form themselves, in their intimate love in marriage, via " I”s into a " We”. Wojtyła's phenomenology is known as a compelling personalistic defense of what are too often dismissed as merely traditional mores (chastity, modesty, a right sense of shame). His philosophical thinking on appreciate and sexual intercourse is a carefully up to date demo of the perception of the age range.
Keywords: Wojtyla, I, We, personalism, the usage, self-determinism
Wojtyła's phenomenological research of person and human being action opens the idea of self-determination, or the way that people, in deciding on and executing actions, identify themselves by using a possession of themselves that is simultaneously a free regulating of themselves. This self-determination is essentially powerful, or essentially an zestful and activating of the self's powers, but it includes functions of knowledge. Above all it rests on an awareness and assent to truth. In the case of love, or specifically sexual love, this self-determination presupposes selected affective and attractive thoughts in the human psyche. Require feelings, while essential, are but the origins or materials of sexual love. They need to be bundled, as Wojtyła is fond of saying, in to acts of selfdetermination whereby people not only feel for each and every other although also dedicate themselves to one another. At the amount of feeling there exists attraction, but there is not but selfdetermination. Yet only self-determination can make appeal into appreciate and only therefore does love come truly into lifestyle.
A key aspect in this research is what Wojtyła calls the Personalistic Usual, and in the light of this theory, interpreted in line with the above thought of self-determination, Wojtyła shows what it means for two people, or two self-determining " I”s, to form a " We”. About what follows Let me first deal with of this norm and then display how it relates to the concept of love, thinking about integration, the concept of the intimate urge, and then the idea of relationship. My display will also take those form of left a comment paraphrase. The explanation for this is that Wojtyła's philosophical thought is, despite the penetration and novelty, so little known it really is in especial need to be restated and rephrased. Mainly because it has been so , it is usually evident enough never to need considerably more by way of discourse. The Personalistic Norm
The Personalistic Norm is based on the claims the person can be an objective reality in the world, that he contains a unique interior life that revolves around truth and benefits, that he possesses the strength of free self-determination. As such anybody is his own learn and judge and does not fall under the right or possession of one more. To quotation Wojtyła:
No one otherwise can need for me. No one can substitute his act of will for mine. It can do sometimes happen that someone very much would like me to want what he wants. This can be the moment when the impassable frontier between him and myself, which is sketched by free will, becomes most obvious… I am and I has to be independent in my actions. Almost all human relationships happen to be posited with this fact. Take pleasure in and Responsibility (Wojtyła 1993 p. 24)
From this that follows that after one's actions have intended for object another individual (as they actually above all regarding love) they have to accord together with the facts about the individual as merely set out. Therefore , for instance, it really is contrary to the idea of the person to take care of someone else as a method or an...
References: Wojtyła, K. (1979) The Performing Person. Converted by Andrzej Potocki and edited by Anna-Teresa Tymeniecka.
Dordrecht: M. Reidel Publishing Co. xxiii+367.
Wojtyła, E. (1993) Like and Responsibility. Translated by H. Capital t. Willetts. Bay area: Ignatius Press. 319.
Wojtyła, K. (1993) Person and Community: Picked Essays. Translated by Theresa Sandok. Ny: Peter Lang.